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1 
Manuel Franzmann  (Frankfurt am Main, 2005) 
Generation and Secularisation in Germany. The succession of generations 
up to the youngest adult generation and the advancing process of seculari-
sation.1 
 
1. Introduction 
When one considers the results of social scientific surveys, secularisation in Germany seems 
to be a more or less linear process of erosion of what is traditionally named religiosity. The 
percentage of citizens who affirm that they are “religious”, believe in God or otherworldly 
beings, hope for life after death or participate regularly in the praxis of a religious community 
has been – by and large – steadily declining for decades. This decline has occurred over the 
succeeding generations: The younger the generation, the fewer “religious” people in it.2  
 
But the process of secularisation is apparent not only in this persistent quantitative shrinkage 
from generation to generation. Above all it also manifests itself – this is my thesis – in the 
transformation of the habitus formations and contents of faith of the generations. The essence 
of ongoing secularisation naturally is reflected most clearly in its contemporary state of 
development which is represented in the youngest adult generation. Therefore the analysis of 
this generation is particularly interesting for the sociology of religion.  
 
But I will not confine this paper to this generation. After indicating some basic premises of 
the sociology of generations and the notion of secularisation I presuppose in this paper, I will 
try to outline hypothetically the succession of generations in Germany, from the so-called 
generation of ´68 to the youngest adult generation, concluding with some remarks about the 
progress of secularisation. The empirical basis of my argument is provided by case 
reconstructions of interviews and group discussions undertaken by a group of sociologists in 
Germany I belong to according to the methodological principles of Ulrich Oevermann’s 
Objective Hermeneutics.3 Of course the presentation of these case reconstructions is not 
possible in this short article. Regrettably such a presentation does not exist in other 
publications at this moment, which is without a doubt a serious deficiency. Without a detailed 
derivation from case reconstructions, the following outline of the succession of generations 
remains without demanding empirical proof. Nevertheless, as hypothetical outline it turns our 
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attention to an aspect of the succession of generations, which has found little consideration 
thus far in sociological research.  
 
2. Premises concerning the sociology of generations 
Now, a few words about my assumptions in the sociology of generations. In this paper I use 
the notion “generation” only in the sense of a distinguishable age cohort which shows a 
specific ”character” and cultural orientation and not in the sense of the three generations in a 
family. Each generation has a specific habitus formation and specific contents of faith (or 
specific “probation myths” to use Oevermann’s terminology4). It is a historical type. 
According to Oevermann5 and drawing upon Mannheim6, I suppose that a generation is 
shaped in reaction to the historical situation of a specific political community and that the 
adolescents of this community become a generation through the socialisation process that is 
framed and affected by historical circumstances. The socialisation process I regard with 
Oevermann7 as structured by a succession of “separation crises”: birth, the end of the primary, 
post-natal, mother-child symbiosis, the end of the “Oedipus complex” and finally 
adolescence. The historical situation has a bearing on the formation of the subjects of a 
specific age cohort in the course of these universal separation crises. Certainly the most 
important separation crisis in the emergence of a generation is adolescence, when they have to 
develop a concept of life which establishes them as independent adults and gives meaning to 
their life as part of the life of their community and humankind. In order to shape their concept 
of life they have to open up to the politico-social situation of the time. This is subsequently 
engraven in their way of thinking and acting and determines both for the rest of their lives 
after they finally leave the social moratorium of adolescence and enter the “time of probation” 
(Oevermann) in which they have to trust their acquired life concept. As members of the 
occupied adult generations they can revise and adjust their original life concepts to the 
transforming societal situation only to a limited extent, whereas the life concepts of 
adolescents downright “originate” from the actual societal constellation. So much for the 
sociology of generations. 
 
3. The concept of secularisation 
Now, very briefly, some remarks on the concept of secularisation I assume in this paper. I 
regard the process of secularisation as an unavoidable and in a sense logical consequence of 
Weber’s universal-historic dynamics of rationalisation which thrives in the Judaeo-Christian 
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religious tradition. I conceive it in Weber’s terms as a process whereby the life conduct 
becomes ever more disenchanted, rationalised and methodical. That the contents of faith that 
guide one’s life conduct become ever more worldly is implicit in this approach! 
 
Furthermore, I tie in with Oevermann’s “structural model of religiosity”8, which supplies a 
structuralist-pragmatist explanation for the dynamics of rationalisation and secularisation 
Weber analysed and is therefore a crucial enhancement to Weber’s approach. With 
Oevermann’s structural model of religiosity, which I unfortunately cannot present in this short 
article, one can demonstrate that the secularisation process materially refers to the potential 
for autonomy9 that distinguishes human life. The process of secularisation consists in the ever 
more elaborate articulation of this autonomy potential in the myths of provenance and 
probation that guide life conduct. Thus the secularisation process is to be understood not only 
formally, as the substitution of religious with secular contents of the life conduct, but also as a 
material process directed at the realisation of the autonomy potential.10 In it the search for 
answers to the three universal mythical questions “Who am I? Where do I come from? Where 
am I going?” is given over to the Individual. Trusting in God and his earthly “representatives” 
who were considered as delivering these answers to the Individual is replaced by trusting 
oneself. However, this development only really becomes evident in the industrialised world in 
the second half of the 20th century, when the life conduct of the Individual becomes 
progressively detraditionalised, as – in the sixties – traditional bonds were fundamentally 
questioned. Secularisation is thus a lengthy gradated historical process. Firstly there was the 
secularisation of intellectual discourse in the Enlightenment. Then came the practical 
secularisation for the basis of legitimate rule in the French Revolution. In this transition from 
the doctrine of divine right to the sovereignty of the people, the potential for autonomy was 
realised only in the most general sense. Its realisation in the details of the praxis of the nation 
state, including individual life conduct, has not yet been completed and probably never will 
be. And a further major step would and probably will be the introduction of a sufficient and 
unconditional basic income for every citizen, i.e. irrespective of any income from other 
sources and of age, without requiring the performance of any work or the willingness to 
accept a job if offered. A basic income once more would expand enormously the autonomy of 
the Individual. It would mean the valediction from the still collectively binding and therein 
religious work ethics and the enabling of a meaningful positive life without paid work. It 
would thereby resolve the persistent crisis of the “working society” and would lay a stable 
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foundation for the frequently discussed “knowledge society”. So much for the concept of 
secularisation. 
 
4. The succession of generations since the 1960s 
I will now try to outline very briefly the succession of generations in Germany over the last 
fifty years. In so doing I confine myself to the peculiarities of the different generations, 
particularly those relevant to secularisation, and exclude the different historical situations that 
constitute the background of those peculiarities. Naturally the boundaries of the age cohort of 
a generation are not sharp and their determination could only be rough. 
 
(1) I start the outline with the “generation of ‘68”, because in this generation traditional 
bonds were programmatically and principally questioned, which constitutes a fundamental 
break in regard to secularisation. Thereafter Individuals could no longer hold onto traditional 
bonds in an unbroken and taken-for-granted form. David Riesman has analysed the beginning 
of this transformation in the USA after the Second World War as a transition from the “inner-
directed” to the “other-directed character”.11 The German generation of ‘68, which comprises 
those born between 1945 and 1952, is the first generation in which the older principle-guided 
“inner-directed character” has an outsider status and in which the “other-directed character” 
dominates. Henceforth other-direction was a general premise for the formation of generations. 
The departure in principle from traditional bonds posed the following problem for individual 
life conduct: the three universal mythical questions “Who am I? Where do I come from? 
Where am I going?” had to be answered autonomously and not through religious tradition. 
This required a great deal of self-confidence and “ego-capability” (“Ich-Leistung”, Freud) 
and demanded an understanding of the problems of the autonomous life conduct. But these 
requirements were lacking in the beginning and first had to be developed. It is my thesis that 
this process extends over the succession of generations from the generation of ‘68 to the 
youngest adult generation. I would like to sketch this now. 
 
One characteristic of the generation of ‘68 was the symbolic violation of rules. In a sense the 
main concern of this generation was to destroy the old, i.e. traditionality. The principle-
guided, inner-directed character was provoked at every turn and with great success. But with 
regard to the new, i.e. an autonomous life conduct, it was overwhelmed, because in this 
respect this generation was a generation of beginners and dilettantes who underestimated the 
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intricacies of such a life conduct. Instead of really autonomous answers to the three universal 
mythical questions, i.e. individuated concepts of life, the generation continued to orient itself 
towards collectively binding world views. It typically took refuge in secularist ideologies of 
Marxist provenance with revolutionary, emancipatory aims which replaced the criticised 
religion and tradition as collective orientation and were obviously a modernist surrogate 
religion.12 Religious authorities were substituted with the authority of science, in particular 
sociology. In fact this was equivalent to a technocratic blurring of the boundary between 
theory and practice and imposed on the social sciences the role of the supplier of a (secular) 
meaning of life which they cannot fulfil. Autonomous life conduct remained widely an 
abstract idea. 
 
(2) The following generation, born approximately between 1952 and 1960, then sought to 
systematically realise the collectivist-ideological program of emancipation the generation of 
‘68 proclaimed – whereas the generation of ‘68 largely left disjointed provocative and 
symbolic actions without strategy or “master plan”. One aspect of this was a certain sympathy 
with the left-wing terrorists of the 1970s who were admired for their practical consistency and 
their strategic approach in the pursuit of emancipation. 
 
(3) The next generation then turned away from the “top-heavy” ideological orientation of its 
two predecessor generations and particularly from the strategic approach of a collective 
revolutionary action. It continued to feel bound to the collectivist program of general 
emancipation, but the strategic means now paradoxically focused on the Individual and his 
“consciousness”. The approach was to emancipate society through the “transformation of 
consciousness” and the “quest for meaning” that every Individual had to perform by 
him/herself. The slogan “grassroots revolution” is emblematic. With Oevermann I call this 
generation, born between approximately 1960 to 1967, the “crisis of meaning generation”. In 
its search for meaning it consequently was interested in everything that promised “self 
experience” and greater “self awareness”. This generation is the bearer of the esoteric boom 
of the 1980s and 1990s, of the so called psycho wave, of the interest in meditative religions of 
the Far East, of the ecological movement, of New Age and other forms of so-called new 
religious movements. Some colleagues misinterpreted these phenomena as a “return to 
religiosity” and a refutation of the secularisation thesis. In fact this generation has only 
discarded the ideological secularism of its two predecessor generations which was itself 
religious in its claim for collective validity.13 In the search for meaning this generation has 
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opened itself up to the whole spectrum of traditions and offers of ultimate meaning, religious 
as well as secular. 
Its reception of these traditions normally was eclectic and based on the premise that not a 
religious authority but the autonomous Individual decides which contents to adopt for his or 
her life conduct. A restriction of this autonomy, however, lies in the fact that these contents 
were not created autonomously, out of the normal life praxis according to the authentic 
experiences made in this praxis. Rather it continuously adopted these contents from outside 
sources of meaning and from artificial “self experiences” that were sought outside the real life 
praxis where the “self” easily implodes into a blank abstraction. Only the question, which of 
the available, already existing contents will be adopted and combined to a personal patchwork 
myth, was answered autonomously. A consequence of this restricted mode of autonomy was 
that such a probation myth and life concept lacks inner coherence, plausibility and 
authenticity. It was not a product of the individual life praxis in the way the former collective 
religions and myths had consistently grown out of the collective life praxis of a particular 
community over the course of its history.  
In contemporary sociology of religion great difficulties exist in adequately analysing this form 
of “patchwork religiosity” with its restricted mode of autonomy. Often this restriction of 
autonomy is completely ignored as already in Luckmann’s theory of modern religion and its 
“privatisation”. In this over thirty-years-old, but still very influential social-constructionist 
approach the autonomy of the modern Individual is conceptualised as free (consumer) choice 
from a broad palette of ultimate meanings offered by tradition and religious entrepreneurs. 
Little thought is given to the possibility of an Individual that creates his contents of life 
autonomously and consistently according to his biographical experiences. But strictly 
speaking, such an approach remains largely a description or paraphrase of “patchwork 
religiosity” and does not allow for its substantial, instructive analysis. Rather, it results in 
blindness to the analytically important question of inner coherence, plausibility, authenticity 
and “persuasiveness” of the particular contents of faith, as if these contents and their 
plausibility would be irrelevant or insignificant to the sociological analysis of religion. But 
not only for the religious Individual are these contents and their credibility essential. Also for 
the sociological analysis of religion these contents and their inner structure stand in the very 
centre, as Weber has demonstrated in his famous analysis of protestant ethics. Not only 
external causes bring about a religious transformation, but also the internal problems of faith 
propels such a transformation and consequently also a transformation of society. In the case 
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of modern “patchwork religiosity” it is primarily the problem of authenticity and the lack of 
coherence which drives a further transformation.  
 
(4) The following generation corresponds to Douglas Coupland’s US-American “Generation 
X”.14 Born between approximately 1967 and 1975, this generation has given up its 
predecessors’ collectivist program of general emancipation and developed a culture of 
downright avoidance of collectivist idealism which appears as a negative-pattern. The name 
“Generation X” that was used for this Generation in the German feuilletons for a certain time 
expresses this effort of evading identification and particular predicates, so that this effort 
paradoxically became itself a predicate. The Generation typically kept away from idealistic 
objectives with a forced tendency towards irony and the pursuit of its private interests with 
ostentation. It cultivated a lifestyle of being smart, of using marketing techniques to advance 
private interests and of being consumption and “fun” oriented. This negation of collective 
idealism through the accentuated pursuit of private interests undoubtedly meant a further step 
towards an autonomous life conduct, because it paved the way for an autonomous practice of 
making a living, of standing on one’s own feet. But it also included the limitation of the 
autonomous life conduct to self-reproduction. Naturally self-reproduction as such does not 
suffice to furnish life with meaning. The meaning of a human life is only realised in its 
contribution to others, to the community and to humankind. Thus the problem of 
autonomously giving meaning to life remained unresolved. In face of this, it isn’t surprising 
that this generation in general shied away from responsibility to family, society or politics. 
 
5. The youngest adult generation 
(5) Now to the youngest adult generation, born since 1975.15 Naturally, we know less about 
this generation.16 It is almost strikingly inconspicuous and unobtrusive. It is success- and 
achievement-oriented like its predecessor generation. But obviously it interprets success not 
only in terms of the pursuit of private interests, but in terms of “idealistic” criteria as well. 
Because it would seem to engage once more with idealistic, “positive” issues, the expression 
Generation X is no longer appropriate for it. But in contrast to previous idealistic generations, 
that shared common values and aims, the idealism of the youngest adult generation is 
apparently entirely individual as well as sobered. To all appearances it results concretely from 
biography, from autonomously answering the basic mythical questions “Who am I? Where do 
I come from? Where am I going?” in a consistent manner. Thus individuals in this generation 
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seem to be directed to making their own biography a success. Therefore you could call this 
generation, as Oevermann did, “biography entrepreneurs”. It seriously and pragmatically 
endeavours to cope with self responsibility and with the challenging problems of the 
autonomous life conduct. Correspondingly it tries with modesty to take responsibility in the 
family, in society and in politics. This shows up, for example, in the fact that the boy or girl 
friend is usually regarded as a candidate for marriage right from the start, even if a marriage 
seems to lie far away due to the biographical phase and circumstances. The predecessor 
generation dallied with pure fun relationships, “one night stands” and with singleness as a 
virtue. In general the youngest adult generation presents itself as interested in politics but 
without claiming to see through politics, as was typically the case in the predecessor 
generation. It endeavours to prepare solidly for taking over responsibility in a job, whereas the 
predecessor generation was partly successful with marketing bluffs instead of solid 
achievements. (This played a role in the boom in information technologies during the 1990s.)  
 
6. Conclusions. The succession of generations as a process of secularisation 
I have tried to demonstrate that the process of secularisation in the succession of generations 
in Germany not only becomes apparent in the steady quantitative regression of “religiosity”, 
but can also be traced materially in the transformation of the very form of each generation. 
The consciousness of autonomy (autonomy in the sense of a structure potential of human 
life), the understanding of the difficulties and problems of the autonomous life conduct and 
the sovereignty in coping with them seem to grow from generation to generation. The 
autonomy-oriented and in this respect very pretentious, ideological and illusory program of 
general emancipation and de-traditionalisation embraced by the generation of ‘68 was 
gradually replaced by realism and modesty. This succession of generations appears as the 
piecemeal realisation of the constitutive features of an autonomous life conduct, which 
initially was more an abstract program than a concrete reality. Some members of older 
generations followed the line of transformation some steps and revised their original concepts 
of life. There are some indications of certain parallels between the generational change of the 
different modern industrial nations, although the formation of a generation is bound to a 
particular political community. But a detailed knowledge of this phenomenon would be a task 
for future research. In the youngest adult generation the transformation process seems to reach 
the point where the autonomous life conduct becomes more or less quotidian.17 
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10
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and his interpretation of history as a kind of salvific history which aims at the realisation of autonomy, because 
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transformation process where Riesman’s analysis ended. 
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concepts of life in a unified Germany – that is, in a normal sovereign nation state. The German nation state 
therefore is a normality for them. It can serve them as model of the autonomous life conduct. 
16
 Against this background it is perhaps interesting for the reader to know that in January 2005 Oevermann 
started a research project at the University of Frankfurt/M. which primarily focuses on the emerging life concepts 
of contemporary adolescents in Germany with the case reconstructionist methodology of Objective 
Hermeneutics. I belong to this project and will participate in this research process. 
17
 This motivates the speculation that it will be this generation that will accomplish the introduction of an 
unconditional basic income when it dominates the political scene. 
